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It is with great delight we bring to you two responses to reports published 
in the last issue. Emeritus Professor Eric Sharpe responds to Vic Hayes' 
1975 article with reflections on how Religion Studies has developed. In 
an open letter which reflects on his experience of religion in the European 
context, John May shares his response to Richard Hutch's thoughts on 
religious tolerance. 
Twenty Years On: Some Reflections on 
the Study of Religion Then and Now 
Eric Sharpe 
Emeritus Professor University of Sydney 
Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, 
But to be young was very heaven! - Oh! times, 
In which the meagre, stale, forbidding ways 
Of custom, law, and statute, took at once 
The attraction of a country in romance! 
(William Wordsworth, 1805) 
It is one of the privileges of advancing age, to indulge from time to time in a 
little gentle reminiscence. It was Sir Walter Scott who spoke of "the oft-repeated 
tales of narrative old age", and having retired from active academic service, one 
begins to feel n.o.a. coming on. One should not leave it too long, however. Sooner or 
later, memory crosses the narrow dividing line that separates it from fantasy- a 
process well-known to all who have ever tried to teach religion- and then fades 
away altogether. But before that happens, there are a few tales worth the telling. 
It was interesting to read the 1975 Victor Hayes article reprinted in the Autumn 
1998 issue of this Review, which began with an attractive picture of a Buddhist 
Bhikkhu addressing a Sturt CAE class, and being (as one would expect) given the 
class's full attention. I too have a Bhikkhu memory, from 1970. I had come to the 
new University of Lancaster only a few weeks previously, and was on the point of 
taking my first class in Indian Religions. My specialisation, such as it was, was in 
Hinduism; but we thought it as well to run the Hinduism and Buddhist streams 
together for the first few weeks, so that the Buddhists would know what it was 
Gautama the Buddha was intent on reforming. I marched into the classroom - and 
almost marched straight out again. The front row was occupied entirely by saffron-
robed Bhikkhus- at least a dozen of them! Afterward I came to suspect that these 
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charming young men from Sri Lanka, postgraduates who had come to Lancaster to 
study under Ninian Smart, had come to my lecture partly out of politeness, and 
partly to practise listening to English. Certainly they were not there for profound 
spiritual reasons. 
Curiously though, I was able to fill in a few historical details in their picture of 
Buddhist origins. A similar situation arose just before Birgitta and I left the UK for 
Australia, when I was called in by a tiny community of Sufi Muslims in Lancaster as 
an expert witness in a case involving the immigration authorities and the community's 
Pir (spiritual adviser, more or less the equivalent of "family guru") We won our case, 
partly because I was able to help them explain to the authorities the role and 
importance of the Pir in their lives. Again, all that was necessary was straightforward 
information, presented- this time to the lawyers, not to journalists or politicians- in 
an uncomplicated fashion, and backed up by the testimony of those most involved. 
I have always felt it to be of the utmost importance that the study of religion, at 
whatever level, should begin prosaically, on the level of straightforward information, 
most of which is purely factual. Over the years there has been a good deal of discussion 
of the relative merits of what used to be called "the two cultures" (the arts and the 
sciences) in education. No doubt both approaches have much to recommend them. 
What tends to be lost in the process is however the absolutely fundamental recognition 
that before anyone can practise either an art or a science, there has to be something 
more prosaic, namely the mastery of a craft. 
By this I mean nothing more complicated than the process whereby we learn 
to use tools and deal with materials; the experience which teaches us what techniques 
to use, when; and - most important of all, perhaps - respect for the business in 
which we are involved. I say "nothing more complicated", but the process itself can 
be of extreme complexity, and may take many years to learn. Analogies are endless. 
We take for granted that to be a heart surgeon or an airline pilot requires a long 
apprenticeship, and I fancy that none of us would place our lives in the hands of 
either, unless we knew that they had been adequately trained. Similarly in the 
performing arts. As a hobby musician of many years' standing, I know only too well 
the sheer hard work that goes into the professional's training, and how easy it is for 
a moment's lapse in concentration to ruin any performance. But it all has to start at 
the most elementary level, with the playing of scales, or for the singer, vocal exercises 
of the most excruciating dullness. Mistakes can be made, of course, and in the 
following of any craft, are going to be made. But assuming that they are not, the 
final outcome is almost like an act of sub-creation. 
The apprentice either learns or does not learn how to recognise material and 
its qualities, and how to make use ·the tools of whatever trade it happens to be. 
Interestingly enough, the medieval craft guilds were styled "mysteries": the apprentice 
stonemason, goldsmith, carpenter or whoever was taught something more than the 
simple properties of raw material and the elementary use of crude tools - though 
that is where it started. Beyond that there was the possibility of creativity - in due 
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time, and not before time. 
It would be tempting to elaborate further - but I must not trespass on the 
Editor's patience. Let me instead suggest that by these standards, despite all the 
good intentions that there have undoubtedly been, the religious studies business 
since the 1960s (the 1970s for Australia's part) has hardly been an unqualified 
success. 1 That it has generated a fair amount of interest at the undergraduate level, 
we all know. We are grateful for it. Teaching undergraduates has seldom or never 
been difficult, and one positive outcome has certainly been that an increasing number 
of young people have gone out into the world equipped with at least some knowledge 
of the history and ethos of some of the world's religions. I have no wish to complain 
about that. Nor is there much point in my complaining about the state of academic 
politics in general: they affect everyone, though religious studies departments, being 
mostly cottage industries, have proved more vulnerable than the academic fat cats in 
departments which discretion prevents me from naming. But has the outcome after 
twenty years not been, for our part, measurable more in terms of popularity than 
professionalism? 
In the early months of the Sydney department, a little over twenty-one years 
ago (on July 6, 1977, to be precise), I had the privilege of delivering an Inaugural 
Lecture in the Great Hall of the University. I would still be prepared to stand by 
some of what I said on that occasion, though in retrospect, I was being far too 
optimistic on a number of fronts. At the end of it I said that the new department 
(which at that stage consisted of one professor, one secretary and one cat), though it 
might have to start with the simple transmission of bread-and-butter knowledge, 
could not be content to stop there: 
Should it stop there (I said), then I am not sure that it will have achieved very 
much. That is why elementary undergraduate teaching cannot be the be-ali and 
end-all of our department. By their graduate schools shall ye know them! For 
it is out of the graduate schools that future teachers come- teachers in schools, 
colleges and universities - and unless we are able to continue that succession, 
nothing we can do will have lasting value. Mules are useful animals in the 
short term; but their pedigree is not anything to be proud of, and they do not 
establish dynasties. 
I fancy that these words came as something of a shock to some of those who 
heard them. How could we possibly create a graduate school without adequate 
resources? The frank answer, of course, was that we couldn't, and didn't. That a 
number of outstanding PhD students passed through the department nevertheless (I 
won't embarrass anyone by naming names) is something for which I personally 
have always been grateful. These were the ones who learned the craft more by 
practising it than in seminars. Others meanwhile did not. 
In retrospect, I am still easily depressed when I think of a brainwave of mine 
that in the end came to nothing. I have always felt that after three or four years of 
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religious studies, a student ought to be possessed of an all-round competence, and a 
more than average level of interest, in the world of religion in general, and should 
be capable of discussing religious questions rather better than the average journalist. 
Therefore a decree went out that as part of the fourth-year honours examination, 
there was to be a "general paper" (a notion familiar enough to anyone who has ever 
sat for an Ox bridge scholarship examination), the content of which could be anything 
and everything classifiable as "religion", anywhere in the world, at any time. But I 
had failed to take account of the modem student mentality. Dubbed "the horror 
exam", this simple general knowledge exercise evidently struck terror into the hearts 
of successive honours generations. Once I was safely out of the way, it was quietly 
abandoned, zum allgemeinen Gaudium, and by popular demand. 
One of the greatest drawbacks attending the academic study of religion in 
Australia is of course what we have learned to call "the tyranny of distance". 
Geographical distance most of us can cope with, after a fashion, and as circumstances 
permit. Mental distance (I hesitate to say intellectual distance, because intellect has 
little or nothing to do with it) is more problematical. Merely to keep in touch with 
ongoing discussions - the tone rather than the substance - I personally have 
found hard, though there may be more than one reason for that. Let me offer an 
illustration. 
Many of the problems connected with the study of religion we share with 
other sections of the humanities. The crass utilitarianism which has come to serve 
as a substitute for an educational philosophy, is something in face of which we are 
all equally powerless. So too is the secularisation process behind it. There is on the 
other hand one chronic source of disquiet in the international religious studies 
community - one not without parallel in other fields, but which religious studies 
has seemingly been unable either to avoid or to resolve. It is of course the age-old 
conflict between "faith" and "reason", between "theology" and "science", and 
ultimately between two ways of thinking and acting. The "faith" side is the way of 
submission to properly constituted authority, the "reason" side the way of control (or 
at least attempted control) and domination. The one exists in large measure to 
maintain tradition, the other in many cases to disrupt tradition (which is not to say 
that it may not shape traditions of its own). Theology/divinity therefore sustains a 
relationship with a religious community and serves its needs. (I ought perhaps to 
add that although theology and divinity are Christian words, the principle I have in 
mind is applicable across the board.) Religious studies- or whatever else one may 
choose to call it- does not have any such relationship; indeed, one of the major 
reasons why the religious studies experiment was launched was to provide the study 
of religion with a secular frame of reference, and to free it from confessional control, 
real or imagined. Generally speaking, this modest goal was achieved without too 
much difficulty, not least because Christian theology in the 1960s was in disarray, 
and (on the liberal side at least) prepared to innovate. 
This being so, it may seem a little odd to have to record that the "theology 
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versus religious studies" debate remains unresolved. Readers of the (North American) 
CSSR Bulletin (26/3, September 1997) will find a whole issue on the theme. Other 
North Atlantic professional journals, too, return to it regularly. For my own part, a 
long-standing interest in the history of method in the study of religion (in which the 
debate aforementioned has been a hardy perennial) has meant that I have been unable 
to avoid getting involved in the ongoing debate, though increasingly in the spirit of 
Omar Khayyam: 
Myself when young did eagerly frequent 
Doctor and Saint, and heard great Argument 
About it and about: but evermore 
Came out by the same Door as in I went. 
"About it and about"- but about what, precisely? One possible answer might 
be "transcendence" - a slippery word, but one which might be useful if we are 
prepared to indicate what it is we are trying to transcend, and by what means. In the 
infancy of religious studies, most of what we were doing was novel (which gave it a 
transcendence of a kind) but otherwise was fairly prosaic. For the reasons I have 
already stated, students (and not a few teachers) needed to be supplied with some 
basic equipment and some elementary maps before proceeding further. In 1972 John 
Hinnells and I produced a book about Hinduism, with this in mind (Newcastle upon 
Tyne, Oriel Press), for which we were severely taken to task by the lateR. C. Zaehner 
in the pages of the Times Literary Supplement. The burden of his complaint was that 
we had simply missed Hinduism's central feature, "the felt omnipresence of the 
divine", and that this rendered the rest of the book's 200 pages worthless. What was 
chiefly irritating about this was its unfairness. We had been judged, it seemed, by 
the standards of the ashram instead of the classroom, and eventually I was able to 
say so in print. Quite possibly the occasional student will be impelled to undertake a 
voyage of spiritual, and not just intellectual discovery, under the aegis of the religious 
studies enterprise, but that is not anything we can or should try to control. 
Victor Hayes' 1975 article makes a special point of the importance in the 
educational context of having each great tradition interpreted by one of its 
representatives. I don't mind admitting to a certain feeling of ambivalence on this 
issue. Inevitably it puts one in mind of the time-honoured practice of getting the 
local priest or minister to come in to the local school and perform this service on a 
once-a-week basis - sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't- although by now 
widened out beyond the Christian frontiers. At its best, the principle has to be a 
positive one: it goes without saying that only an insider can know what it feels like 
to be a follower of a way of faith on a daily basis. The words, "I know how you feel," 
are therefore seldom justified, and may be met with deep resentment, no matter how 
well-intentioned they are. These days it is generally taken for granted that in matters 
of human relations, the claim to have "understood" another's feelings, motives, 
hopes and frustrations is best kept to oneself. In religion, more and more 
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"TRESPASSERS WILL BE PROSECUTED" signs are going up. Examples are 
legion. Only women can understand women, only gays can understand gays, only 
African Americans can understand African Americans - and so on. A recent book 
review in the Times Literary Supplement (January 2, 1998) ended with the words: 
"One is led to the unsatisfactory conclusion that to write a book about Christians in 
India one probably has to be Christian from India." 
I have, as it happens, written a fair amount about Christians in India, and 
hope to write a little more before I finally hang up my ancient typewriter. I accept 
the reviewer's point- with one important reservation. I would not for one moment 
presume to tell anyone what it feels like to be a Christian in India, though I can (I 
trust) observe and listen. Even that, incidentally, is not going to proceed very far 
without considerable skill in languages - and who can guarantee that in these 
days? If this applies (as it undoubtedly does) to India's Christians, what of the Hindus, 
Muslims, Buddhists, Jains and the rest? Are they waiting out there to be "understood"? 
Or have we perchance been just a little carried away by our good intentions? 
My reservation is that although we should show restraint in what we expect 
religious studies to achieve by way of inter-religious "understanding", we have no 
reason to limit the enterprise in that way. 
In the religious studies dawn, when we were all reformers, no words were 
more bandied about than "understand" and "understanding", mainly because we 
genuinely believed the study of religion in the past to have been deficient in that 
regard. I think now that we underestimated the difficulties of the exercise. Much 
might be said, but I will limit myself to two points, both of which Victor Hayes 
mentions (p. 67): first, that if we fail to tackle the ways in which religions speak to 
"persistent and elemental human problems", we are doing only half a job; and second, 
that the student has to "bracket" his or her commitments and preconceptions and 
"enter imaginatively" into the other religion's Weltanschauung. So there were to be 
no more "false religions": the believer, we said sagely to one another, is always 
"right" - even when to the world at large the believer might appear to have been 
(or to be) disastrously wrong. Cultural vandalism was out; dialogue was in. 
Twenty years on, I am convinced that like all the other believers, we were 
right- as things then were. But we were altogether too optimistic when we assumed 
that our students would be able easily to suspend judgment on what we were trying 
to teach them, and adopt a value-free, non-judgmental, "phenomenological" stance 
on everything we offered them. For one thing, it was not even-handed: gurus and 
lamas and bhikkhus were listened to; archdeacons by and large were not. For another 
- and this was more important - once the study of religion at the undergraduate 
level had become mainly a matter of contemporary concern, behavioural analysis 
and investigative journalism, superficiality tended to set in sooner rather than later. 
Ever since the late 1960s I have been a warm supporter of the principle of 
interreligious dialogue, and have written far more about it than has been good for 
me. The practice, on the other hand, has often left me in a state of bewilderment. 
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Often the Christian (no one else, so far as I am aware) is urged to enter into the 
religious experience of the followers of some other way of faith "imaginatively", to 
see things as they see them, value things as they value them, and so on. The literature 
of inter-religious dialogue since Vatican II is full of exhortations along these lines. 
Paul Knitter's No Other Name? (1985) will serve as an example: on p. 210 Knitter 
writes that 
The theology of all involved must also admit to the possibility and necessity of 
entering into the religious experience of another tradition [emphasis in original]. 
In fact, only when this is attempted does the conversation really get off the 
ground. 
From dialogue conferences, sentiments of this general kind have drifted over 
into undergraduate religious studies classes, to the point where there has come to be 
little appreciable difference between the phenomenology of religion (as a branch of 
secular existentialism) and the world-wide dialogue of religions (as a branch of 
theological existentialism). 
But is it possible to exercise one's imagination in this way? If it is possible, is 
it desirable? And is that what we have been trying to do all these years? 
Certainly it is possible. Without the exercise of the imagination, the study of 
religion (or anything else for that matter) is going to remain a barren exercise. Old-
style comparative religion tended sometimes to convey the impression that "dead 
religions" had somehow always been dead. At least there was no real danger of the 
ghost of a long-dead Pharaoh rising up to complain that we were bearing false 
witness against him and his people! But at least we tried to be aware of the problem. 
The trouble was, and is, that the imagination is apt sometimes to get things totally 
and disastrously wrong: to be paranoid, for instance, is to have an imagination that 
is hyperactive and diseased at the same time. To speak enthusiastically about "entering 
into the religious experience of another tradition" is easy enough; but how precisely 
do you do it? Merely to be dissatisfied with your own (assuming you have one) will 
not do. Sometimes, though, we appear to have conveyed the impression that religious 
studies has in fact been pointing in this direction all along. Personally I doubt it. 
Nor is interreligious dialogue as trouble-free an exercise as some seem to 
imagine. Mostly these days we manage to approach one another in a spirit of 
friendliness, and that is something for which we can be grateful. But friendliness is 
not quite the same thing as friendship, which needs to be developed over a long 
period of time, and to be mutual. We may not care to be reminded of this too forcefully, 
but interreligious relations in the past have been hostile more often than friendly 
(here and there they still are). Communities look at one another and hear the 
politicians talk about "the peace process"; but then they remember a few of the less 
accommodating things that have been said in the past, and a few of the less than 
charitable things that have been done. I happen to know that this has been the actual 
reaction in some quarters to what the liberal wing of Christianity has been saying 
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about dialogue since the 1960s: that the new velvet glove may in fact conceal the old 
iron fist. 
Memory is of the essence. "Culture" is very much a matter of collective memory: 
of times and places and persons, of victories and defeats, of suffering and exile, and 
of old enemies. No one enjoys free and unlimited access to another person's memories, 
and even limited access is granted only by special invitation. Incidentally, should 
you wish to obliterate a culture, what you must do is to erase its memories - and 
substitute new ones, manufactured for the occasion. The phenomenon is a common 
one, and becoming commoner. 
Religion is dangerous. It is also difficult. One has to work for a lifetime to find 
out how little there is that can be known, and the forces that it can release upon the 
unsuspecting. Here in Australia I tend to feel that we have hardly even begun to 
scratch the surface of what might be done. All honour to those who have tried, and 
are trying, in an intellectual atmosphere which has seldom been supportive, has 
sometimes been hostile, and has almost always been indifferent. Incidentally, if there 
should be an Ultimate Reality involved, then what we have been doing is a kind of 
theology; if not, a kind of behavioural science. Let us not waste any more time on 
that particular subject, which will probably still be around in another hundred years. 
Let me end, not with a peroration, but with King Arthur's riddle: 
"The old order changeth, yielding place to new, 
And God fulfils himself in many ways, 
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world .... " 
Note 
1. In this paper I use the words "religious studies" instead of what others may prefer to call 
"religion studies" or "studies in religion", simply because they enjoy international, and not 
just local, currency. 
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The Heavy Hand of the German State 
An Open Letter to Richard Hutch on 
Attitudes to Scientology 
Dear Richard, 
It's a long time since we last met and I'd rather have a chat with you over a 
beer about this, but there are some aspects of your report on the Berlin conference on 
"The Dangers oflntolerance" (Review, 1111 [1998] 54-62) that I'd like to see discussed 
among AASR members. My first contact with New Religious Movements (or 
Jugendreligionen, 'Youth Religions', as they were inappropriately called) came when 
I was teaching in Germany in the seventies; in fact, the first seminar I ever offered 
was on this topic. Some of the groups, notably the Unification Church and the Children 
of God, were going about their business quite aggressively, and there were also some 
Indian gurus operating in a highly manipulative way. Meanwhile, the Red Army 
Faction was embarking on its career of terror and the Federal Republic, over-anxious 
to establish its credentials as a liberal democracy, faced the classical dilemma of 
using illiberal means - such as the infamous Berufsverbot or exclusion of putative 
terrorist 'sympathisers' from all state services - to protect liberal ideals. 
You are right to mention the spectre of Nazism (61, n. 5) as part of the 
explanation of Germany's heavy-handed reaction to Scientology. German politicians' 
fear of extremism is like German economists' fear of inflation: both are fed by 
experiences of collapse and chaos in the recent past. But the historical roots of the 
current hostility to Scientology go even deeper, right back to the Treaty of Westfalia 
(signed in Munster in 1648) which created the first tentative framework for 
acknowledging pluralism, both of religious beliefs and political ideologies, in 
continental Europe. The experience of the English-speaking countries has been very 
different, particularly the United States, which over a century later received these 
freedoms as already formulated principles. The result, as you rightly point out, is 
that the Germans still tend to think of religious freedom in terms of the state-approved 
co-existence of 'the two confessions', as they habitually refer to the Catholic Church 
and its Protestant (not just Lutheran) counterpart. But even in the decade and a half 
since I lived there Germany has made great strides in coming to grips with burgeoning 
religious diversity, particularly in learning to live with a substantial Muslim minority. 
A Jewish educationalist from Britain, addressing our Council of Christians 
and Jews recently, estimated that 10 million Europeans now regularly vote for fascist 
parties. While this is in no way a re-run of the political instability of the Weimar 
Republic, it does give democrats pause, and the recent election result in Queensland 
suggests that Australia might have to give serious thought to the same phenomenon. 
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So there are many historical reasons for Germany's extreme sensitivity towards any 
groups whose secretiveness makes them appear to be states-within-the-state, from 
the Catholic Church at the time of Bismarck's Kulturkampf to the right-wing 
extremists of today. There's another factor, too: the Germans can't abide fakes and 
charlatans. 
Which brings us to Scientology. In the context I have sketched, it is little 
wonder that Scientology, of all the minority religious movements, arouses the special 
ire of German officialdom. To me it seems irrelevant whether courts find that 
Scientology is or is not a religion; the only rule of thumb a pluralist democracy can 
go by is something like 'it's a religion if it says it is'. What I missed in your report 
was any substantive assessment of just what Scientology is and does. What comes 
across is your almost crusading concern for the abstract principle of religious liberty 
("Let us continue to be vigilant!") whilst prescinding entirely from any consideration 
of what the democratic consensus may be expected to tolerate. 
Your account of the Berlin conference and the events surrounding it, it seems 
to me, is informed by two principles which are undoubtedly among the greatest 
achievements of Enlightenment thought: the strict value neutrality of the scientist, 
in this case the student of religion; and the individual's absolute right to freedom of 
choice, particularly in the sphere of religion. Their fruit is that tolerance without 
which democratic societies cannot function. Admirable as they are, however, they 
are also one-sided unless complemented by two further principles: that scientific 
enquiry springs from particular interests and engages commitments, including moral 
ones; and that the individual's right to freedom is balanced by duties to the community 
which sustains that freedom. Taken together, and viewed in the light of history, 
these make your case against German intolerance of Scientology less clear-cut. 
Put with less prissiness: if I, as a student of religion, arrive at the conclusion 
that L. Ron Hubbard, alleged author of the notorious remark "I'd like to start a 
religion. That's where the money is", was a despotic charlatan and that his brainchild 
Scientology is a cynical rip-off, then saying so in appropriate psycho-social language 
does not make me illiberal. I may be wrong, which is why I submit my judgement to 
the criticism of my peers, but if I believe that Scientology is a public danger I not 
only have a right but a duty to say so. Furthermore, as a theologian I cannot avoid 
the incomparably more difficult question of truth and falsity; 'it's true if they say it 
is' will not serve as a criterion at this level. Having heard Johannes Aagaard of 
Aarhus thunder against 'sects and cults' like an Old Testament prophet, and with 
memories of some highly dogmatic reactions to the new movements from Lutheran 
sources, I nevertheless believe that a dialogical response is possible and should be 
attempted for the sake of religious truth. 
I have no doubt that the experiences you detail in your report were harrowing 
and gave you a rather jaundiced view of a legalistic and intolerant German 
establishment. But Scientology is no slouch, either, when it comes to intimidating 
critics and infiltrating hostile organisations. In this respect the opportunism of 
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Scientology in leading the crusade for religious tolerance is little short of grotesque. 
As one who endured the rigours of a pre-Vatican II Roman Catholic novitiate and 
has seen my church discredit itself by its authoritarian response to dissent and scandal, 
I do not want to be the one to cast the first stone. But neither do I see refusal to 
tolerate Scientology's excesses as a stick to beat the mainline churches with. 
If ever you're passing through Dublin- one of the liveliest European capitals 
these days, not least in its growing religious diversity - I'd like to introduce you to 
Mike Garde, a Mennonite with a very interesting mixed background who monitors 
the religious groups scene with some half-hearted support from the churches and 
who helped me write. this letter. Mentioning him reminds me of the last time we 
met: in the bus on the way to visit a Hutterite community outside Winnipeg during 
the 1980 IAHR conference. I don't think either of us will ever forget the honesty 
with which our Hutterite host fielded all our questions and patiently explained every 
aspect of a way of life which, on the face of it, is the ultimate sectarianism, yet he 
betrayed no trace of intolerance. Perhaps that's the compass bearing that all of us, 
students and practitioners of religion alike, are going to have to rely on more and 
more: integrity with openness. 
Thanks again for your report, which certainly got this reader thinking, and 
best wishes to you and your colleagues. 
John May, 
Irish School of Ecumenics, Dublin 
